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1I ORIENTATION
Karanga mai, mihi mai,
Tena koutou, tena koutou katoa1
As a non-Maori I am conscious that I may inadvertently cause offence
through not fully comprehending the different Marae kawa (customs
and procedures) shared by different tribes comprising Maoridom, which
to some extent may act as a substitute for formal law.2 It might be said
that as an outsider observing various elements of New Zealand’s legal
system I am: He kuku ki te kainga, he haka ki te haere (A pigeon at
home, a parrot abroad).3 My purpose this evening is neither to wade
into internal debates concerning current law reform, nor to criticise
well-established local customs and practices I am unfamiliar with.4
Rather I wish to create a context within which we
1
     A Maori greeting that translates, “Thank you for your welcome, Greetings,
greetings to you all.” I wish to acknowledge the generous support of the
leading law firm Chapman Tripp that enabled me to visit New Zealand and
to thank Dean Palmer, his colleagues and students at the Faculty of Law,
Victoria University of Wellington for providing such a convivial and
stimulating working environment. I have also benefited greatly from
discussions with participants at two seminars I gave in the Faculty of Law
at Victoria University, Alison Stephens and members of the Access to Justice
Team at the Ministry of Justice, Tim Bannatyne and Frances Blythe of the
Legal Services Agency, Margaret Thompson of the Law Commission and
Duncan Webb, of the School of Law at the University of Canterbury, none
of whom is of course responsible for any opinions or mistakes that must
remain my sole responsibility.
2
     See H & P Tauroa, Te Marae: A Guide to Customs & Protocol (Auckland,
Reed, 1986). J Patterson, Exploring Maori Values (Palmerston North,
Dunmore Press, 1992) at p 102 notes that,”…there is in classical Maori no
word for “law”…This does not mean that there was no law – only that there
was no need to formulate it into an explicit code of rules. Instead, the way
of Maori law is to follow the ancestors, who are the model to the kinship
group”.
3
       A Maori saying which supposedly refers to “A person who is as quiet as a
pigeon in his own village chatters like a parrot when away from home and
finds fault with everything”, Maori Proverbs (Auckland, Reed, 1992).
4
     For a general introduction to the legal system in (New Zealand) see M
McDowell & D Webb, The New Zealand Legal System: Structures,
Processes & Legal Theory (2 ed, Wellington, Butterworths, 1998).
2may better understand some of the challenges confronting modern
legal systems struggling to become more accessible to that (often silent)
group legal professions invariably claim to represent: namely citizens.
My title alludes to Kubrick’s masterwork 2001: A Space Odyssey –
which begins a voyage into the future in the past – and is intended to
bring together what are essentially personal reflections arising out of
an intellectual odyssey which began twenty-six years ago when, as a
young researcher working with the leading Italian comparative lawyer
Professor Mauro Cappelletti on his famous Florentine Access to Justice
Project, I was first attracted to and inspired by the international “Access
to Justice Movement”.5
Around two decades ago after trying to persuade policy-makers of
the need for a rural law centre (or Community Legal Centre) in Devon
which finally was launched last October I developed and co-directed
another interdisciplinary project with geographers examining access
to justice in rural communities - particularly in Southwest England -
called the Access to Justice in Rural Britain Project  (AJRBP).6 This
study involved an empirical investigation of the distribution and work
of lawyers - including paralegals - and also research into the legal
needs (or contacts) of the inhabitants of three remote rural parishes.
Three control studies in other parts of the United Kingdom were
commissioned: in Scotland, Wales and in East Anglia to check
5
     Homer’s Odysseus took 26 years to complete his epic voyage and, like
Stanley Kubrick, I am interested in the relationship between man and
technology, in particular drawing attention to the human element in the
justice system. This humanistic perspective on civil justice has its roots in
the Florence Access to Justice Project:  Cappelletti, Mauro & Garth, Bryant
(eds). Access to Justice. (Milan/Alphen aan den rijn, Giuffrè/Sijthoff and
Noordhoff, 1978-1979).
6
     Access to Justice in Rural Britain Project (AJRBP): ESRC-funded project:
1984-87: E00232054.  See Blacksell, Economides & Watkins, Justice
Outside the City, (Harlow, Longman, 1991); reviewed by Jon T Johnsen,
“Rural Justice: Country Lawyers and Legal Services in the United States
and Britain”, (1992) 17 Law and Social Inquiry, 3, 415-436. This project
developed out of an attempt to set up a rural law centre based in Exeter,
see further: Kim Economides, “Legal Services and Rural Deprivation”,
Bracton Law Journal, (1982) 15, 41-78. Sir Stephen Sedley in Plymouth
formally launched the Devon Law Centre on 22 October 2001. See also
Economides & Blacksell, “Access to Justice in Rural Britain: Final Report”
(1987) 16 Anglo-American Law Rev 353.
3the findings coming through in our surveys in Southwest England. This
project established the importance of looking at both the supply and
demand sides of legal service provision while also highlighting the
complex relationship between the two.
My more recent work, which I consider also relevant to the broad
theme of “access to justice”, turns the inquiry inwards, as it were, away
from legal service provision toward the whole field of legal ethics.  And
I would wish to argue today that the essence of the problem is no
longer limited to citizens’ access to justice, but rather, must also include
that of lawyers’ access to justice. Indeed, I would go so far as to argue
that the former is quite useless without the latter.
The following observations, based on the above experience, will
therefore concentrate more on the theme of accessing justice than
interpreting citizenship. Instead of engaging in a discussion of the
fundamental guarantees of modern constitutionalism (although I must
concede there are important connections to be made between the
theme of access to justice, constitutionalism and citizenship, as seen
for example in the “right of action”7) I prefer to pitch my observations
at an intermediate theoretical level which examine some practical
determinants, as opposed to abstract definitions, of citizenship. My
present aim is to explore some of the pragmatic consequences and
policy lessons generated by research investigating the extent to which
citizens actually enjoy access to the legal system  - and I trust this falls
within the remit of the New Zealand Centre for Public Law (NZCPL)
and will be of interest to public lawyers.
Toward this end there are two broad areas I wish to consider. The
first concerns the nature of the problem of access, including the
methodological problems, surrounding previous studies on the
mobilisation of law by citizens. I would like, moreover, also to consider
policy questions directed at reforming law and legal services that aim
to enhance their accessibility. The second area concerns contemporary
definitions of justice, which seem to focus on managerial conceptions
7
     Cappelletti & Cohen, Comparative Constitutional Law, (Charlottesville,
Bobbs-Merrill, 1979) ch 6.
4of “quality”. In other words, the epistemological problem of how we
can understand what it is that we actually wish to give citizens access
to?  Access to what?  My principal argument is that we need to affect
a shift from civil to civic justice.8 It is worth noting that Marshall’s
distinction between social and political rights is, in practice, often blurred
since both categories are mediated and enforced through the modern
welfare state and conflicts over entitlements invariably expressed
through the medium of law.9 The assertion of such rights is something
that is very much closely related to the work of lawyers, even if they
may choose not to recognise this fact. It may therefore be necessary
to move away from a rigid application of Marshall’s classifications,
which, although helpful in terms of comprehending the scope of the
problem, perhaps divert us away from important connections, which
do or could exist at the level of practice. How might, or should, lawyers
move beyond representing individualistic civil claims to actually
articulate more collective, political, civic - or even perhaps social and
economic - rights through the legal process?
The conclusion I shall reach, however, is that we must not be
confined to this macro-political level, considering only the application
and meaning of either distributive or corrective justice, terms typically
defined in the Aristotelian sense. I shall be suggesting that now is the
time to examine further, at the micro-level, the particular understandings
of justice possessed by individual members of the legal profession.
And I shall argue today that the contemporary access to justice
movement must engage with the relatively new theme (at least for
academic lawyers) of professional ethics. My tentative conclusion is
not that we have to make a choice between these approaches, but
rather that we must manage somehow to create, sustain and balance
within our analysis of access to justice a novel synthesis between these
macro- and micro- levels. We must steer between the Scylla of “access”
and Charybdis of “quality” if we are to discover new ways of reaching
justice.
8
    Trubek & Trubek, “Civic justice through civil justice: A new approach to
public interest advocacy in the United States” in Cappelletti, (3), above n
5.
9
    TH Marshall, Citizenship and social class and other essays (1950).
5II THE SCYLLA OF “ACCESS”
After more than two decades of intense socio-legal and comparative
research we understand the broad contours of the nature of the problem
of access to justice, even if it must be conceded that effective practical
solutions to the problem everywhere remains elusive.10 Policy-makers
across different governments and jurisdictions – including New Zealand
- seem permanently engaged in local experiments directed at finding
the most promising solutions and continually introduce reform after
reform in the hope of cutting the costs of justice without simultaneously
undermining its accessibility.  The evolution of access reforms is
therefore very much a cross-cultural phenomenon which is also
intimately bound up with transformations in global economies and
nation-states, particularly the crisis in the modern welfare state and
also, interestingly, with changing professional boundaries. My aim here
is simply to summarise briefly some of the more important insights
generated by research coming from Europe and North America.  It
goes without saying that these lessons that have arisen in specific
social, political and economic contexts must be treated with caution.
The socio-economic and demographic conditions that prevail in New
Zealand mean that we should be hesitant about importing or
mechanically transplanting reforms developed elsewhere. On the other
hand, one should not exclude the possibility that home-grown
experiences and perspectives could be exported in order to contribute
to the quest for justice elsewhere and it is worth noting that New Zealand
has in several significant areas acted as a legal laboratory contributing
to reforms or debates carried out elsewhere in the common-law world.
     The creation of the new Legal Services Agency (LSA) set up under
the new Legal Services Act 2000 replaces the previous Legal Services
Board and closely resembles the shift in transfer of responsibilities in
the UK when, following the Access to Justice
10
   See Galanter,”Why the ‘Haves’ come out ahead: Speculation on the limits
of legal change” (1974) 9 Law & Society Rev 95. See also, Smith & Lloyd-
Bostock, Why people go to Law: An annotated bibliography of social science
research, (Oxford, Centre for Socio-legal Studies, 1990) and the Windsor
Yearbook of Access to Justice (Windsor, Ontario, Faculty of Law, University
of Windsor, 1981). H Genn, Paths to Justice (Oxford, Hart, 2000).
6Act 1999, the Legal Aid Board was superseded by a new Legal Services
Commission (LSC).11 Both bodies are seeking to better understand
and meet “legal needs” in order to make the legal system more
accessible to various constituencies. But here in New Zealand more
attention appears to be given to women, rural communities and the
legal education of the population at large through “Law Related
Education”(LRE).12
The key to an understanding of the nature of access to legal services
is to perceive the problem in three-dimensional terms. The three
elements we must keep in mind, if possible simultaneously, are these:
1) the nature of the demand for legal services; 2) the nature of the
supply of legal services; and 3) the nature of the legal problem clients
may wish to bring to a legal forum. And we should not forget that in
practice a very close inter-relationship exists between all three
variables.13
The early “unmet legal needs” studies, as they have become known,
sought to objectively quantify need. There were also various studies
done of attitudes of the general public in several jurisdictions - studies
of the “knowledge and opinion of
11
    See Legal Services Agency, 2000-2001 Annual Report and Business Plan
2001-2004: Looking Forward (Wellington, 2002).
12
   See T Bannatyne, “The future of Law Related Education in New Zealand”,
paper delivered at the Legal Services Research Conference, Oxford, 20
March 2002. See also report prepared by the LSA by NFO CM Research,
Review of Unmet Legal Needs in the Auckland Area: Quantitative and
Qualitative Research Report (Wellington, 2001) and the project being
developed by the LSA to assist rural communities in the West Coast of the
South Island: paper by J McIntosh, West Coast Project: Provision of law-
related information and education (LSA, 2002). The Law Commission has
also conducted a major study into women’s access to justice: J Morris
OBE, Study Paper 1 – Women’s Access to Legal Services (Wellington,
1999). See also research commissioned by the previous Legal Services
Board: G Maxwell et al, Meeting Legal Service Needs: Research Report
prepared for the Legal Services Board (Wellington, Legal Services Board,
1999).
13
    Marks,”Some research perspectives for looking at legal need and legal
services delivery systems: old forms or new?” (1997) 11 Law & Society
Rev 191; Lewis, “Unmet legal needs” in P Morris et al, Social Needs and
Legal Action, 1973; Curran, The Legal Needs of the Public: The Final Report
of a National Survey (Joint American Bar Association/American Bar
Foundation Study), 1977; Cass & Sackville, Legal Needs of the Poor (Study
for the Australian Government Commission of Inquiry into Poverty), 1975;
Schuyt, below, n 24.
7law” or “KOL studies” - perhaps the best known of which was directed
by Adam Podgorecki, a Polish legal sociologist who investigated public
attitudes to law.14 With hindsight, some of these studies now seem
somewhat limited in scope. They fail to consider all of the complex
processes determining entry to the legal system and the fact that access
may often be a consequence of choice, rather than being determined
by ignorance or the lack of economic resources. Furthermore, the
assumption that the majority of the population either wants or needs to
have access to the legal system today seems questionable in the light
of the debate over “avoidance” of disputes.15 Some of these studies
also reveal a rather crude understanding of the characteristics of clients
and the legal services supposedly they were seeking to use. And finally,
perhaps too heavy an emphasis was placed upon a crude economic
explanation for the use, or non-use, of legal services, ie poverty.
In the 1960s, an important study in the United States, by Carlin and
Howard, found that the poor did have access to justice in many
instances, especially when they were in receipt of legal aid, and
consequently this challenged the dominant economic explanation for
lack of access.16 It was also becoming apparent that both the rich and
organisations very often preferred not to use legal services and instead
settled their disputes by more private or informal means.17 Although
this was not a particularly new trend its discovery was novel as seen,
for example, in work on law in nineteenth century England examining
the significance of the early development of commercial
14
   Podgorecki et al, Knowledge and Opinion about Law, (London, Martin
Robertson, 1973).  See also, Cain and Kulcsar (eds), Disputes and the
Law, (Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó, 1983).
15
   Felstiner,”Influences of social organisation on dispute processing” (1974)
9 Law & Society Rev 63; see also debate between Felstiner and Danzig &
Lowy at (1975) 9 Law & Society Rev 675, 695 and Kidder,”The end of the
road? Problems in the analysis of disputes” (1980-81) 15 Law & Society
Rev 717.
16
   Carlin & Howard,”Legal representation and class justice” (1965) 12 UCLA
Law Rev 381.
17
    Macaulay,”Non-contractual relations in business: a preliminary study” (1963)
28 AmvSocvRevv 55; “Lawyers and consumer protection laws” (1979) 14
Law & Society Rev 115.
8arbitration.18To return to the Carlin and Howard study, this was of
seminal importance for it identified four crucial stages through which
citizens must pass before they actually could enter court:19
Lack of economic resources represents only one element in a
complex social process leading an individual to seek out an obtain legal
representation.  At least four steps are involved: (1) awareness or
recognition of a problem as a legal problem; (2) willingness to take
legal action for solution of the problem; (3) getting to a lawyer; and (4)
actually hiring a lawyer.
The point to note about all of these early studies is that they focused
almost exclusively on the characteristics of clients, or potential clients,
wishing to avail themselves of legal services.
Gradually, however, a greater measure of methodological
sophistication enters as researchers began to understand and
appreciate the significance of psychological (and other) barriers to
access to justice, particularly concerning the fear that people have of
lawyers and of the legal system.  In other words academic thinking
about access started to transcend economic perspectives and new
methodologies arose which focused attention on other barriers to
justice.  One might also mention the work in the United Kingdom,
conducted in conjunction with geographers, which exposed the barrier
of physical distance on access to legal services.20 Access to justice
does have a significant geographical dimension but most of the earlier
“legal needs” studies completely overlooked it.
18
   Ferguson,”The adjudication of commercial disputes” (1980) 7 British Jor of
Law and Society 141.
19
   Above, n 16, 423.
20
   Above, n 6. This is obviously a particularly acute problem in any remote
rural area and one that must affect many parts of New Zealand, which also
contains indigenous populations in remote and relatively unexplored terrain.
See further K Economides, “Law and Geography: New Frontiers” in Thomas
(ed), Legal Frontiers (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1996).
9In one of the most respected and widely cited studies of the US
Law & Society movement, Marc Galanter developed a more rigorous
and comprehensive analytical framework, which drew attention to an
important distinction between what he called “Repeat Players” (RPs)
and “One-Shotters” (OSs).21 RPs referred to organisations or business
plaintiffs with regular experience of the legal system who were able to
deploy it strategically, and he contrasted this category of client with
OSs which invariably were individual consumers having very limited, if
any, regular experience of law and legal services.  The OS clearly
lacked “legal competence”, something more than mere control over
economic resources, which implies the ability to apply strategic
understanding, or tactical know-how, in order to manage the legal
system in such a way as to secure long-term advantages.22
Although many of these early studies explained the use and non-
use of legal services (and access to the legal system more generally)
largely with reference to the attitudes, resources, and approach of
individual clients there developed in the 1970’s an important alternative
focus, which came to be known as the “Social Organisation Theory”.23
The research by Mayhew and Reiss in the United States, who
conducted a major study of the population in Michigan, focused
attention not so much on clients but rather on the supply side of the
lawyer-client equation: ie, the nature of legal services that were on
offer.  Broadly speaking, the lesson that emerges is that if one wishes
to comprehend how it is that citizens access legal services one really
does need to understand something about the nature of the work of
lawyers, their attitudes and the style of legal services they provide.  In
other words, lawyers habitually serve
21
    Galanter, above, n 10.
22
   See also Blacksell et al, above, n 6, Chap 6 which added a further dimension.
This research showed that “legal competence” was not simply an individual
characteristic determining client access. Also important is the immediate
family and social network surrounding an individual - the wider
competencies and legal experiences of friends and family are essential
elements determining an individual’s capacity to mobilise law and the legal
system.
23
    Mayhew & Reiss,  “The social organisation of legal contacts” 34 American
Soc Rev 309 (1969); Mayhew,”Institutions of legal representation: civil
justice and the public” (1975) 9 Law & Society Rev 401.
10
particular categories of clients: large city firms invariably cater for
corporate clients while the poor regularly receive legal aid from public
defenders, criminal legal aid practitioners or family law practitioners.
In all of these traditional categories of dispute clients can and do have
access but, as the Dutch legal sociologist Schuyt explains, this still
leaves significant gaps in provision:24
Lawyers serve individuals mostly in divorce cases; they do not to
any great extent serve individuals in their conflicts with governments or
organisations.  On the contrary, lawyers serve corporate bodies and
large organisations.
The point to note, however, is that the nature and style of legal
service provision are both crucial factors influencing, if not determining,
the mobilisation of law.25
The supply of legal services is something which is not only controlled
by the private legal profession and it is worth pointing out that there
are also important opportunities for local and central government to
extend the scope of legal services in order to fill gaps left by the private
market. So, for example, if government actively supports proactive
legal services, not only through funding the work of the private legal
profession via legal aid schemes, but also by investing directly in the
work of courts, extra-judicial and para-legal services - citizens’ access
inevitably will be enhanced as a result. If, therefore, public legal services
in the form of advice/justice centres are located in local communities
close to where needs are particularly acute such proactive services
could have a disproportionate effect in terms of stimulating the demand
for, and use of, legal services. However, we should not ignore the fact
that there are also powerful disincentives for any government
contemplating such an investment: first, it may be defending the very
legal actions it is funding; second, that stimulating litigation through
the provision of informal procedures and small claims
24
   Schuyt et al, De weg naar het recht “The Road to Law” (Deventer, Kluwer,
1976; English version: European Yearbook in Law And Sociology (1977)
111).
25
   Blankenburg,”Mobilisation and the Law” (1984) 2 Government and Policy
461.
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courts could exacerbate overall problems of court congestion (and
costs26) in the wider legal system and third, direct investment in
attacking the underlying causes of poverty and injustice might be a
cheaper and more effective strategy to secure “justice” than reliance
on lawyers and legal remedies. My argument here is simply that
proactive legal services can act as a magnet attracting legal problems
while, conversely, traditional legal services based on the market - where
lawyers shelter themselves in downtown areas, behind offices and
formal suits distant from local communities - merely reinforces the
inequalities of the market by repelling unprofitable legal work.  Legal
aid is riddled with paradox and contradiction.27
Finally, the third dimension to the problem of legal service delivery
is now better understood: that is that the type of legal problem is also
an important variable determining access.  As Schuyt points out above,
there are clearly a whole range of disputes which no matter whether
clients are rich or poor, they are ill served by any branch of the legal
profession.  This may in part be because the trial process artificially
individualises conflicts, which in reality concern groups or the wider
public interest.  The legal process still does not appear to be well suited
to representing large-scale claims, which have significant political or
economic consequences for society at large.28 For example,
environmental rights - or “meta-individual rights” - which transcend the
interests of any particular individual yet affect all citizens often are not
well-represented by either the suppliers of legal services or by particular
groups of clients purporting to represent the wider class.  I
26
   There has been an interesting debate in New Zealand on costs that illustrates
this tension. Following a report of the Department for Courts (see: <http://
www.courts.govt.nz/publications/papers.html>) fees for filing claims
apparently have increased considerably despite the introduction of the Court
Fees Waiver Act 2002 that was introduced to allow courts to waive fees
upon application. See further the Minister for Courts press release: <http:/
/www.schnauer.co.nz/political/courtcosts.htm> where the approach seems
to be to shift “small claims” down to the informal Disputes Tribunal.
27
   Abel, “The paradoxes of legal aid” in Cooper & Dhavan (eds), Public Interest
Law, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1987).
28
   Chayes,”The role of the judge in public law litigation” (1976) 89 Harvard
Law Rev 1281.
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wish to conclude this part of my analysis by drawing attention to the
interaction between the above three variables and making two broad
observations. First, that the problem of access is not simply a problem
of individual or citizen choice: responsibilities also fall on both
government and the professional bodies in order to ensure that access
is delivered to excluded groups. Second, that reliance on the market
in many ways perpetuates gaps in legal service provision, seen not
only in terms of areas of legal work but also in terms of geographical
areas. If these gaps are ever to be filled this will require determined
action by government - and also the legal professions - both acting in
concert.
III THE CHARYBDIS OF “QUALITY”
I wish now to move on to consider more closely the nature, role
and responsibilities of key policymakers inside government and the
legal professions in providing the framework within which access
reforms can develop to ask what is behind the so-called “quality”
agenda. Some preliminary questions might usefully be put at this point:
whose “access to justice” are we talking about? Why should
government, or the professions, be at all bothered about our theme of
“access to justice”?  What consequences flow from the denial of
access?  One immediate response lies in the legitimation needs of
both government and the legal professions whose credibility, if not
survival, depends in part on the rhetoric surrounding rights and
professional ideals being realised, at least to some extent, in practice.
Access to justice thus connects with the twin themes of citizenship
and constitutionalism by supporting and reinforcing the Rule of Law,
which as the philosopher Roberto Mangabeira Unger notes, “has been
truly said to be the soul of the modern state. The study of the legal
system takes us straight to the central problems faced by the society
itself.”29 In other words, both political and professional legitimacy is at
stake should it happen that there is a persistent and widespread denial
of access to state-funded, or private professional, legal services.
29
   RM Unger, Law in Modern Society, (New York, Free Press, 1976) 192.
13
In many Western European countries - and in particular Britain - the
principal driving force behind current “access” reforms is neither an
altruistic desire to enhance citizenship nor are these reforms a reaction
to any crisis of confidence in professional or political ideals (though
elements of both are clearly present); rather the overriding imperative
of government policy appears to be finding new ways of reducing the
costs of delivering legal services, which in most countries has been
escalating beyond all control.30 In England and Wales, for example,
the legal aid bill – I refer to the bill for not of rights - has been expanding
exponentially and, although now slowing down, continues to direct
massive amounts of public money toward the private profession despite
signs that some discipline is now being exercised over spiralling costs.31
The current trends toward alternative legal services, informal justice,
alternative dispute resolution (ADR) and conditional fee arrangements
should all be seen as attempts to divert, reduce or spread the costs of
expensive legal cases by experimenting with novel means of dispute
processing, management and funding, with any subsequent
enhancement of citizen access (or political/professional legitimacy) a
positive but secondary side-effect.  If it is correct that the primary
objective of governmental access reforms is simply to reduce the
financial burden on the state does it follow that ultimately they are
doomed to failure or are irrelevant to the quest for deeper (or even
more pragmatic) conceptions of justice?
At this point it may be instructive to remind ourselves of the Florence
Access to Justice Project and the underlying philosophy it advocated
of “making rights effective”.32 The liberal political theory informing this
project, which I believe remains
30
    Blankenburg,”Comparing legal aid schemes in Europe” (1992) 11 Civil J
Qtly 106.
31
   Gross expenditure on legal aid in New Zealand appears to be declining
from $86,441,000 in 1998/99 to $79,251,000 in 2000/2001, LSA Annual
Report, above, n 11, 67. Legal aid expenditure has in recent years been
about double the rate of annual inflation although there are signs that
government policy is now beginning to exercise some control over costs. It
is estimated that at present some 30% of the total turnover of the Bar and
15% of the turnover of solicitors comes from legal aid.  See further R Smith,
Justice: Redressing the Balance, (London, Legal Action Group, 1997).
32
    Above, n 5. Cappelletti & Gordley “Legal aid: modern themes and variations”.
(1972) 24 Stanford Law Review 347.
14
valid even today, was to shift the emphasis away from formal rights
towards substantive justice. Cappelletti’s analysis of contemporary
judicial review refers to an evolutionary continuum linking the French
Revolution, the UN Declaration of the Rights of Man, and the
internationalism of the human rights movement, particularly during the
post-war period, which finally embraces the development of regional
human rights. But the main conclusion arrived at is not so much that
we need more rights - or more statements of rights (important as these
may be for constitutional lawyers or political symbolism) - rather the
on-going challenge is to find new ways and means of making the rights
citizens already possess both “effective” and “enforceable”. It follows
that through rigorous procedural scholarship on the nature, scope and
role of civil justice systems in delivering the abstract rights often
enshrined in legal rhetoric we can expose the deficiency and hypocrisy
surrounding constitutional discourse.  This essentially “English”
perspective places greater emphasis on the pragmatic means for
enhancing and delivering the accessibility of law and the legal system
rather than giving legal expression to a constitutional “right of action”.
The analytical framework developed by the Florence Access to
Justice Project was structured around the metaphor of three waves:
the first was legal aid (or judicare); the second, public interest law - the
articulation of the representation of collective rights through class
actions and public interest litigation; and the third, what has now come
to be called the “access to justice approach” - including informal justice,
diversion of cases away from the formal legal system and the
simplification of law.33 These themes associated with the third wave
are very topical in England at the present time following a major
investigation of the whole civil justice system led by
33
    Id. Lewis points out that the metaphor of “waves” or “tendencies” is not
entirely satisfactory, “not just because comparative lawyers assume that
changes fulfil similar needs but also because they assume that we have a
satisfactory account merely by showing the existence of apparently similar
countries, whereas this only begins the inquiry into the circumstances
underlying those similarities” in Abel & Lewis (eds), Lawyers in Society:
Comparative Theories (3), (Berkeley, Univ of California Press, 1989) 71.
15
Lord Woolf.  This review has questioned basic tenets of English civil
procedure with a view to improving and cutting the growing costs of
the civil justice system.34
One question that might usefully be asked of these “third wave”
reforms is whether in essence they promote “ access to justice” or “
access to peace”.  By that I mean that dispute resolution is not
necessarily to be equated with access to justice. The danger I wish to
draw attention to is the fact that citizens may be offered peaceful
solutions, possibly even solutions with which they are extremely happy
and content, but such solutions could result in something less than
they would receive were they to enforce their formal rights through the
official legal system. In such circumstances there is a very real danger
with this fashionable and ubiquitous trend toward legal informalism,
namely that we end up negating many of the values, importance and
historical significance of legal formalism.35 The metaphor of “waves”
is perhaps simplistic, but it does serve to identify certain crucial phases
regarding the intellectual and policy developments produced by this
global Access to Justice Movement.
IV JOURNEY TO AN UNKNOWN DESTINATION?
By way of conclusion, drawing upon another of Roberto Unger’s
insights that: “...we can account for a basic, common experience in
modern society...the sense of being surrounded by injustice without
knowing where justice lies. This condition is the political side of that
more general sentiment of arbitrariness and even absurdity which
gradually enters into the consciousness of every group”,36 I wish to
identify a fourth, perhaps final, wave of the access to justice movement,
namely lawyers’ (including judicial and all others involved in the legal
services industry) access to
34
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justice.  Within the “consciousness” of the legal profession there exists
a curious, almost invisible, paradox: how can lawyers who are directly
involved in the administration of justice themselves comprehend
“access to justice”? The daily experiences of lawyers and their very
proximity to “Justice” perhaps blinds them to more profound conceptions
of justice (internal or social) and, consequently, allows the profession
to ignore the relationship between civil and civic justice.  Our “fourth
wave” seeks to expose the ethical and political dimensions to the
administration of justice and, at the same time, establish new links
between professional responsibility and legal education.1
     The problem today is not one of simply measuring citizens’ access
to justice, for example through mapping gaps in legal service provision,
but rather of opening up new perspectives on defining justice itself.  I
therefore propose a major shift from methodological to epistemological
questions, or, put another way, to re-focus our attention away from
access to looking afresh at justice. To what kind of “justice” should
citizens aspire?  Instead of concentrating on citizens’ access from the
demand side, I would like to suggest we move on to consider more
carefully citizens’ access to justice, but from the supply side and at two
distinct levels: first, citizens’ access to legal education and entry to the
legal profession; second, once qualified, lawyers’ access to justice.
Having surmounted the barriers to entry to the courts and the legal
profession how can citizens ensure that either judges or lawyers will
be equipped to deliver “justice”?
     The first issue I wish to raise then is access to legal education: who
can qualify as a lawyer or a judge?  Who has access to law school?
Since law schools invariably are the gatekeepers to the legal profession
we need to understand who has access to them and on what basis. Is
entry primarily governed according to nepotistic or meritocratic
37
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the role of education in counter-acting “value devaluation” see: Economides,
“What are Fundamental Legal Values?” in K Economides et al (eds),
Fundamental Values. A Volume of Essays to Commemorate the 75th
Anniversary of the Founding of the Law School in Exeter 1923-1998.
(Oxford, Hart, 2000) 12-13; K Economides (ed), Ethical Challenges to Legal
Education & Conduct (Oxford, Hart, 1998).
.
17
principles?  Should government, the professional bodies and individual
lawyers do more to promote positively access to the legal profession
on behalf of women, disadvantaged minorities and other groups who
are socially, or historically, excluded?1 Thus, access to the legal
profession should be seen as an important dimension, even
precondition, to the question of citizens’ access to justice.
The second and more difficult question is how to guarantee, once
they are inside the profession, that both lawyers and judges have
access to justice.  This raises in turn ethical issues concerning the
wider responsibilities of law schools and the professional bodies in
controlling not only entry but also determining standards.  These issues
are present in most modern legal systems all of which struggle with
reconciling tensions between maintaining the quality of, and access
to, justice.2
Before either of these two questions can be properly answered we
need to understand better the role and responsibilities of law schools
in the formation of lawyers’ professional character.  It appears that in
many jurisdictions there is a widespread cynicism about law, lawyers
and justice which may even be encouraged by what goes on in law
schools.3 In many societies the law is perceived to be (and often is)
out of reach; justice is some distant Utopian, and therefore unattainable,
ideal; and lawyers the object of cynical humour, rather than deserving
of the public’s trust, confidence and respect.4 Legal ethics is often
seen as an oxymoron and the
38
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relationship between lawyers and justice is at best highly problematic.
Are not lawyers almost everywhere characterised as being primarily
motivated by the pursuit of profit rather than their commitment to justice
and ethical practice?  If so, is this a consequence of the fact that legal
education typically concentrates on doctrinal rather than contextual
analysis and subscribes to a strong positivist tradition which rigidly
separates law from morals?
Answers to such questions may become clearer if we begin to
examine cross-culturally both the “macro” dimension to the distribution
of law as a resource as well as the “micro” dimension of professional
responsibility. A useful starting point might be to consider the statements
concerning lawyers’ responsibilities enshrined in their constitutions,
the professional code of conduct.1 These must be examined in terms
of how far they promote and sustain equal opportunities, humane
professionalism and human rights.  Perhaps they are silent about such
values preferring instead to focus on policing conduct as opposed to
eradicating injustice. Professional values, as well as technical
competence, need to be communicated and handed down to the next
generation of lawyers.  Although many law schools provide instruction
in the field of human rights law this area will often be given no higher
status than many other areas of the curriculum.  I would like to argue
that human rights should be accorded special status in the curriculum
because of its central relevance to both citizenship and professionalism.
Some might go further and argue that the modern lawyer needs some
equivalent to the medics’ Hippocratic oath?1 What we clearly need at
the
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present time is a wide-ranging discussion of the fundamental values
that should govern lawyers wherever they choose to practise.44
Responsibility for promoting and widening access to legal education,
law and justice might become more of a collaborative project between
law schools, government and the professional bodies. What are the
responsibilities of law schools in equipping future lawyers to service
the legal needs of the public? Not simply at the level of inculcating
skill, in terms of teaching legal method and the craft of law, but rather
communicating something of the value and potential of law in terms of
its power to transform social relations and ameliorate the human
condition. Professional and governmental bodies which control entry
to, and regulate the conduct of, legal professions also have a significant
role to play in directing legal services to fill gaps left uncovered by the
market. New Zealand is to be congratulated on taking a lead in bringing
ethical concerns to the fore of the law curriculum. You are particularly
fortunate to have a Law Faculty here at Victoria University ideally
placed, by virtue of its traditions and location, to continue mapping
and exploring the path(s) to justice. As so often in human endeavour,
one suspects the journey along the way may well prove more significant
than reaching that final, perhaps unattainable, destination.
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